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Contrary to the view that democratic aspiration has been utterly marginalised in China since the 1990s, the 
discourse of democracy continues to flourish via the Internet and other means of communication, and a budding 
“rights defence movement” (weiquan yundong) has emerged as a new focus of the Chinese democracy 
movement in China. The emergence of this rights defence movement foreshadows a new, more optimistic 
political scenario in which transition to a stable constitutional democracy through constructive interactions 
between state and society may occur. This paper explores the social and political context behind the rise of the 
rights defence movement in China, assesses the role played by rights defence lawyers (weiquan lushi) in shaping 
the rights defence movement and speculates on the implications of the rights defence movement for China’s 




Democratisation of communist China is a major international as well as domestic concern. 
With the Chinese democracy movement shattered in 1989 after the Tiananmen Square 
crackdown, and with the rapid marginalisation of the dissident democratic activist leaders, a 
pessimistic view developed among China scholars in the late 1990s predicting that due to its 
political stagnation and demographic and environmental challenges China was likely to 
collapse and be left in a state of prolonged domestic chaos and massive human exodus 
(Chang 2001). More recently, a new and equally pessimistic forecast of “resilient 
authoritarianism” has gained currency, which argues that China’s authoritarian system is not 
stagnant but constantly adjusting to new environments, and that the combination of a market 
economy and political institutionalisation has made the current authoritarian political system 
sustainable for the foreseeable future (Nathan 2003, Pei 2006). Yet both of these two camps 
underestimate the positive political impetus for democratisation among the Chinese 
population and within the Chinese Communist Party itself. Contrary to the view that 
democratic aspiration has been utterly marginalised in China since the 1990s (Xu 1999), the 
discourse of democracy continues to flourish via the Internet and other means of 
communication, and a budding “rights defence movement” (weiquan yundong) has emerged 
as a new focus of the Chinese democracy movement in China (Feng 2004, 2008).  
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The emergence of this rights defence movement in connection with the new development of 
the legal profession foreshadows a new, more optimistic political scenario in which transition 
to a stable constitutional democracy through constructive interactions between state and 
society may occur. Legal reforms in China have come a long way since the beginning of the 
“reform era” in 1978 when the legal profession did not exist and there were only two laws, 
namely The Constitution and The Marriage Law. Over the last three decades, the ideas of a 
legal system, the rule of law and human rights have eventually taken roots in Chinese society; 
China has enacted hundreds of laws and established a modern court system and hundreds of 
law schools; China has actively participated in the international human rights regime, signing 
more than 20 international human rights conventions; and  the leadership has allowed space 
for the growth of the legal profession, with more than 150 thousand lawyers employed at 14 
thousand law firms in China today. An essential point of this paper is the interdependency of 
the rule of law and transition to constitutional democracy in China, a relationship in which 
the rights defence movement is playing a vital role. The paper explores the social and 
political context behind the rise of the rights defence movement in China, assesses the role 
played by rights defence lawyers (weiquan lushi) in shaping the rights defence movement and 
speculates on the implications of the rights defence movement for China’s transition to 
constitutional democracy. 
 
The Rise of the Rights Defence Movement in China  
The current rights defence movement is a comprehensive movement involving all social 
strata throughout the country and covering every aspect of human rights. Due to a strict ban 
on organised opposition, rather than taking the form of a coordinated nationwide movement, 
the rights defence movement has instead developed as a diverse and increasingly forceful 
wave of isolated cases reported daily in the media, as well as public protests (“mass 
incidents”, the term coined by the Chinese communist party-state to describe unapproved 
strikes, assemblies, demonstrations, petitions, blockages, collective sit-ins or physical 
conflicts involved 10 or more people) . Those “mass incidents” numbered 60,000 in 2003, 
74,000 in 2004 and 87,000 in 2005, an average of 200 protests a day, according to official 
figures. (Yu 2007; Hu 2008). Some of them may involve thousands of people and result in 
police and paramilitary intervention leading to loss of lives. The movement is not merely 
“rightful resistance” of the rural poor (O’Brien and Li 2006), but has also become an urban 
phenomenon facilitated by the growing strength of the middle class and the latest 
technologies such as the Internet and mobile phones. 
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Defence of economic and social rights 
Most cases of this rights defence movement aim to defend economic and social rights, 
including protests by peasants against excessive taxes, levies and forced seizures of farmland; 
strikes of workers against low pay, arrears of pay and poor working conditions; protests by 
laid-off urban workers against unfair dismissal by their employers; protests by home owners 
against forced eviction by government and developers; protests of residents against forced 
relocations; campaigns by citizens for unpaid social entitlements; campaigns for the rights of 
women and children; and protests of affected residents against environmental pollution. 
 
Many serious protests involve peasants, the largest and most vulnerable “disadvantaged 
group” (ruoshi qunti) in China, accounting for more than 60% of the entire population. 
Detrimental factors such as lack of arable land, lack of capital, poor education, poor 
technology and poor accessibility make the life of Chinese peasantry difficult. Their hardship 
is exacerbated by the state discrimination, especially the “household registration system” 
which limits the mobility of peasants and deprives them of the state welfare and the 
opportunity of employment in the state sector. Although replacement of the “people’s 
commune” with “household responsibility system” and other policies in the reform era since 
the 1980s have increased autonomy and mobility of Chinese peasants, their life chance is still 
greatly limited by the subsistence agriculture relying on a very small piece of land allocated 
to each household. While this small piece of land generates very little income for peasant 
households, until very recently they had been very heavily taxed and levied to fund the 
salaries of local cadres and public projects. Worse still, land in the rural areas is run by local 
governments and does not belong to individual peasants. More often than not, local cadres 
collaborate with property developers to use the land for commercial purposes to bring in local 
financial income and personal gains, with little benefits for peasants. The peasants launched 
protests when they were desperate. One important development in last two years was that in 
some areas the peasants have raised bold demand for land ownership. In December 2008, 
when separate groups of peasant farmers in four provinces, Heilongjiang, Jiangsu and 
Shaanxi and Tianjin (one of the four provincial level municipalities) published very similar 
statements on the internet claiming to have seized their collectively owned land from the state 
and unilaterally privatised it (Shi 2008). The Chinese law stipulates that all rural land is 
owned by the state, which leases it to individuals to use on a 30-year contract basis but can 
take it back with relative impunity. The peasant rebellions and appeals by lawyers and liberal 
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intellectuals have put tremendous pressure on the state to revisit the policies on the 
landownership. 
 
In spite of the strict ban by the state, strikes by workers have become increasingly frequent in 
China, especially by the most vulnerable migrant workers from rural China, who are denied 
the right to collective bargaining or to form trade unions outside the official All China 
Federation of Trade Unions. Bureaucratic constraints often prevent them from obtaining legal 
redress for owed wages and other labour rights violations (Chan 1998). According to labour 
expert Han Dongfang, director of China Labour Bulletin, the Pearl River Delta in Guangdong 
Province, China’s industrial powerhouse manufacturing one-third of Chinese exports, sees at 
least one major labour dispute involving at least 1000 people daily, not to mention those 
smaller strikes (Lee 2008). One new development is that China’s Labor Contract Law, which 
came into effect in January 2008, has provided further encouragement for workers to assert 
their rights of better working condition and higher pay within the legal framework.  
 
Massive protests in environmental protection represent a new area of social movement in 
China, which has witnessed a steady increase in environmental discontent and complaints 
induced by pollution incidents during the past few years. Apart from the growing claim of 
victimhood through official channels, protests led by environmental non-governmental 
organizations (ENGOs) and other antagonistic actions taken by the population are on a 
drastic rise. According to Pan Yue, deputy director of the State Environmental Protection 
Administration (SEPA), pollution-induced mass incidents grew by 29% every year, with 
more than 50,000 pollution disputes across the country in 2005 alone (Pan 2006). 
 
Defence of civil and political rights  
The cases of defending civil and political rights are also on the rise, including campaigns by 
lawyers, journalists and writers for the freedom of speech and press; campaigns by 
practitioners of the Christian house churches and Falun Gong practitioners for the freedom of 
religions, beliefs, assembly and association; campaigns against arbitrary detention , “reform 
through labour”, torture and excessive death penalty; campaigns by victims of the party-state 
agents against injustice and abuses of public power, particularly by thousands of  petitioners 
who flow to the national capital or provincial capitals from all over the country to seek 
redress from perceived injustice; Protests by migrant workers against the household 
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registration system and other discrimination; and protests by peasants against the 
irregularities and manipulation in village elections. 
 
The fights by millions of Falon Gong followers and Christian family church members to 
assert their rights of beliefs and religions have attracted a great deal international attention. 
The Leninist party-state in China permits five official religions – Buddhism, Islam, Taoism, 
Catholicism and Protestantism – provided that they submitted to strict state supervision. 
When spiritual entrepreneurs try enticing followers on their own or anyone practicing 
religions without state sanction, they are banned. Falun Gong began in 1992 as a form of 
qigong, a general name describing physical and mental disciplines based loosely on 
traditional Chinese medical and spiritual practices. According to historian David Ownby, 
Falun Gong is a new version of Chinese traditional “redemptive societies.” They are 
organised around charismatic leaders who preach that salvation can be attained through 
cultivation of body and mind (Ownby 2008). On April 25, 1999, more than ten thousand 
Falun Gong practitioners gathered outside Zhongnanhai, the guarded compound where 
China's highest leaders live and work, in a day-long peaceful protest of police brutality 
against fellow practitioners in the neighboring city of Tianjin. Stunned and surprised, and 
with the fear of a potential threat to their legitimacy and control, China's paranoid leaders 
declared Falun Gong an “evil sect” (Xiejiao) and launched a campaign of brutal suppression 
against the group. Within a few months, the police had imprisoned tens of thousands of Falun 
Gong followers. The group claims that some 3,000 of its members were tortured to death in 
custody. Falun Gong has survived the suppression and transformed into a well-financed and 
well-coordinated international movement. While Falun Gong followers in exile have 
launched vigorous counter-charges in their own comprehensive media against the Chinese 
communist regime, those within China have turned into underground practitioners.       
 
Chinese family churches (jiating jiaohui) are assemblies of unregistered Chinese Christians 
independent of the government-run Christian organisations. They are also known as the 
"Underground" Church or the "Unofficial" Church, although this is somewhat of a misnomer 
as they are collections of unrelated individual churches rather than a single unified church. 
They are called "family churches" because as they are not officially registered organisations 
and they cannot independently own property. Hence they meet in private houses, often in 
secret for fear of arrest or imprisonment. Family churches operate outside government 
regulations and restrictions, but they are not officially outlawed. Their leaders and members 
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are often harassed by the government officials mainly for the fear of popular mobilisation 
outside the government control. This persecution may take the form of arrest, a prison 
sentence, re-education through labour, confiscation and heavy fines. Family church members, 
numbering at least 50 million and accounting for 70% of total Christians in China, have 
rigorously fought back by organising demonstrations and defending themselves in lawsuits 
(Wei 2007).     
In another development, illegal interception and arbitrary detention of petitioners bringing 
grievances to higher authorities in China have become more systematic and extensive, and 
hence a major concern. China’s petitioning system has a long cultural and historical tradition 
dating back to imperial China and remains in place under the Communist rule. The legal basis 
for the current petitioning system, known as the Letters and Visits system, is provided by the 
Chinese Constitution which protect the rights to petition and the State Council Regulations on 
Letters and Visits, which provides a systematic and coherent framework for the practices of 
petitions. The Chinese government encourages petitions and has an extensive governmental 
bureaucracy to handle them, because the party-state needs the petitioning system as a 
window to understand the sources of social problems and unrest and as a release valve to 
maintain social stability, in the absence of other channels to raise grievances, politically-
charged grievances in particular. However, officials at all levels of government have a vested 
interest in preventing petitioners from speaking up about the mistreatment and injustices they 
have suffered. Local authorities in particular have always been motivated to prevent 
information about rights abuses committed at the local level from reaching higher authorities. 
As petitioners bring complaints about lower levels of government to higher authorities, they 
face harassment and retaliation. After 2003, when the Custody and Repatriation System that 
controlled population movement by detention and forced return to their places of household 
registration was abolished, the Chinese government has developed a complex extra-legal 
system to intercept, confine, and punish petitioners in order to control and silence them, often 
employing brutal means such as assault, surveillance, harassment of family members, 
kidnapping, and incarceration in secret detention centres (known as ‘black jails’), psychiatric 
institutions and Re-education through Labour Camps. The interception of petitioners violates 
a number of basic human rights, such as the rights to freedom of expression, to liberty and 
security of person, and to freedom from torture and other cruel, degrading or inhumane 
treatment. Petitioners, officially estimated to be 10 million, believe strongly that their rights 
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have been violated and persist to seek redress, but they are amongst those most vulnerable to 
human rights abuses in China today (CHRD 2008). 
Factors contributing to the rise of the rights defence movement 
Qin Hui, one of the most important Chinese scholars concerned with rights issues, has argued 
that the secret of China's current economic advantage is its low human rights standards, a 
salient feature of “power elite capitalism” (quangui ziben zhuyi). China has become an 
investor's paradise because the prices of the four prime factors of production (human capital, 
land, credits and non-renewable resources) have been kept at artificially low levels by 
reducing the bargaining power of providers through political suppression (Qin 2007a). There 
is no doubt that one essential factor behind China’s economic success is the abuse of rights 
and the environment (Yu 2006; Yu 2007; Wu 2008). The Chinese authorities also admitted 
that the current waves of “mass incidents” stem from the wide spread of rights abuses, 
including land seizures, forced evictions, and environmental disasters (Li 2009).  
 
Nevertheless, the theory and practice of social movements have demonstrated that even 
widespread abuses do not necessarily lead to social protests; other factors may be required, 
such as a split within the ruling bloc, and the evolving rights consciousness and political 
calculation of the population (Scott 1985; Foweraker 1995). The development of the Chinese 
democracy movement since the 1980s and the re-emergence of liberalism and social 
democracy since the 1990s have greatly enhanced rights consciousness among the Chinese 
population (Feng 2003; Goldman 2005).  
 
Prior to the Beijing Olympics in August 2008, a group of Chinese lawyers and activists 
launched a petition bearing the names of more than 14,000 people calling for ratification of 
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Again on 9 December 2008, in 
commemoration of the 60th anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, rights 
lawyers and other rights activists published on the Internet Chapter 08, known as the 
“Chinese human rights manifesto” and signed by more than 8,000 Chinese citizens since its 
publication, spelling out 19 steps for rights protection and political reform, including a new 
constitution, freedom of speech and assembly, an independent judiciary and democratic 
elections for all levels of government. Thus, the sharp increase in protests against rights 
abuses in China since the beginning of the new century may have more to do with the raised 
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level of rights consciousness among ordinary Chinese citizens rather than an escalation of 
rights abuses. 
 
The Chinese government has always defended its human rights record against international 
criticism, sometimes defensively, arguing that feeding and clothing 1.3 billion people 
supersedes political rights in the short term, and sometimes more aggressively, arguing that 
no country has the justification to interfere in the internal affairs of another country, including 
criticizing its human rights record. However, despite this defensive rhetoric, efforts have 
made even by the Chinese Party-State to come to terms with human rights. One could argue 
that until the 1990s, the law had been cynically exploited by the Party-State as a tool for 
shoring up its dictatorship. The international discourse on human rights was officially 
repudiated as “bourgeois liberalism” and as a “Western conspiracy of peaceful evolution” – 
in other words, an attempt to overthrow the Chinese regime by stealth. However, partly due 
to domestic and international pressure and partly as a response to the imperatives of a 
developing market economy and globalisation, the Party-State has begun to engage in a real 
dialogue on human rights and has adopted a cautiously positive approach towards 
international human rights norms since the 1990s.  
 
In 1991, the Chinese government published its first White Paper on Human Rights, followed 
by similar reports almost annually after 1995. The China Society of Human Rights Studies 
was established under the State Council, and numerous research centres on human rights 
were set up throughout the country. The government signed The International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in 1997 (ratified by the National People’s Congress in 
2001) and The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights in 1998 (pending 
ratification). In accordance with its policy of “getting on track with international practice” (yu 
guoji jiegui) since accession to the WTO in 2001, China also revised the PRC Constitution in 
2004 to add the words “the state respects and protects human rights,” enacted a Property Law 
in 2007 that guarantees the right to private ownership of property, and announced a State 
Action Plan for Human Rights in 2008. Likewise, the Communist Party has officially 
replaced the concept of “class struggle” with the ideal of “building a harmonious society” 
with increasing emphasis on the rule of law. Furthermore, a clear distinction has been made 
between the rule by law (law as a tool for the rulers) and rule of law (rulers subject to the 
law). Rights and rights defence have now become popular topics in the State media as well as 
in Chinese cyberspace, which enjoy much greater freedom than in the past to comment on 
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political issues. It is safe to claim that the Chinese government is becoming increasingly 
tolerant of rights assertion, in spite of the fact that it continues to selectively crack down on 
individual rights defence lawyers and human rights activists.  
 
The dual leadership role of the rights defence lawyers 
It is generally agreed among Chinese political activists and scholars that the rights defence 
movement proper in China was kick started in 2003 by two major events: the Sun Zhigang 
case and the SARS epidemic (Wang 2003; Fan 2005a; Tang 2005; Liu 2006; Teng 2006). In 
March 2003, Sun Zhigang, a resident from Hubei Province looking for employment in 
Guangzhou, was detained for not having proper identity documents and was beaten to death 
in police custody. The incident triggered nationwide protests led by journalists, human rights 
activists, legal scholars and lawyers against institutional discrimination and inhumane 
treatment of migrant workers, resulting in the abolition of State regulations on detention of 
migrants and the entire custody and repatriation system targeting migrant workers. The other 
major triggering event in early 2003 was the government’s attempted cover-up of the severity 
of the SARS epidemic in China, which stimulated the media to a wave of unprecedented 
openness and investigation into government dealings in order to uphold the people’s “right to 
know” [zhiqing quan] (Zhao 2005:12–14). The year 2003 has been named as “the first year of 
rights (quanli yuannian)” in China (Qiu 2003; Hu 2003; Xian 2004).  
 
This claim sounds odd as assertion of a variety of rights has been a theme for democracy 
movement and other civil movements in China since the late 1970s. For example, the 
Educated Youth Returning to Cities Movement during 1976-1979 was a large-scale 
movement for the rights of residence and employment by millions of former urban students 
who were sent-down to the countryside by the party-state during the Cultural Revolution. The 
Democracy Wall Movement during 1978-1979, coincided with the Unofficial Magazines 
Movement, which lasted until 1981, was a pro-democracy and human rights movement 
spearheaded by Chinese democracy activists who demanded and practised the political rights 
of free speech, free press and free association. The 1989 Pro-democracy Movement led by 
students and joined by millions of other citizens aimed not only to clean the government from 
corruption but also to establish a variety of political rights, especially the right of association.   
 
The current rights defence movement is new in two senses. First, the current rights defence 
movement rights are grounded in legal framework and legal process. The new features of the 
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Sun Zhigang case lay in the fact that it was not only a human rights case fought by ordinary 
citizens against the abuses by the state, but also a case that led to the positive response of 
institutional reform by the state to redress human rights abuses. Second, leadership is 
provided by the legal profession, rights defence lawyers in particular. It has been a classical 
story known to all that the petition sent to the National People’s Congress by three young 
graduates holding PhD degrees in law from Beijing University, Jiang Yu, Teng Biao and Xu 
Zhiyong who later became rights lawyers, played a key role in bringing about a rare review 
on constitution violation and subsequent abolition of the notorious Regulations on Detention 
and Repatriation of Beggars and Floating Population (Kingdom Law Firm, 2008). With their 
professional knowledge and extraordinary courage, rights defence lawyers have fought in the 
frontline and provided leadership to the emerging rights defence movement (Carnes 2006; Li 
2007). Some have been hailed as “heroes of our times” or “men of the hour”, and have 
enjoyed an increasingly high profile in the Chinese and international media. (Ji & Wang 
2005; Hu 2006; Tao 2006; Ya 2006). 
 
Actually, there is a hot debate among rights lawyers about the strategy of rights defence 
movement. (Teng 2006; Kahn 2007; Guo 2008) For those who take a harder line, it is futile 
and harmful to seek compromise with the ruling Communist Party, as even the “enlighten 
leader” Hu Jintao, in spite of his talks of expanding constitutional rights and strengthening 
the legal system, tightened the Party’s control over the courts and continued to persecute 
rights lawyers; it is impossible to win the political cases for defendants as courts are strictly 
controlled by the Party; the main purpose of lawsuits is to expose the evils of Chinese legal 
system and the crimes of the Communist government. They also support Internet campaigns 
and mass demonstrations, including demonstrations involving violence. There is a tendency 
for mass demonstrations to become violent when the legal system proves unable to redress 
widespread social injustice. In June 2008, based on the rumour that a school girl was raped 
and killed by a son of a local official, thousands of people at Weng’an County, Guizhou 
Province joined together to burn down 160 offices and 42 vehicles belonging to local 
government and police. In July 2008, due to the disputes about ownership of rubber trees, 
hundreds of peasants at Menglian Village, Yunnan Province clashed with police, resulting in 
the death of two villagers and injury of 19 villagers and 41 policemen. Again in November 
2008, due to resentment against forced eviction, about 30 evicted households and thousands 
of other people surrounded the city government of Longnan, Gansu Province, burning 110 
offices and 22 vehicles. 
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For those who take a much softer line, communist bureaucracy is not monolithic and the 
current top communist leaders, committed to attracting foreign investment and making the 
country a respected world power, are running the country “according to law”; the basic duty 
of rights lawyers is to help citizens exercise the rights granted to them within current legal 
framework; through individual litigations against rights violation, rights lawyers are effecting 
positive policy and institutional changes and raising the awareness of the concept of human 
rights. Some notable victories have been won by this approach. The “stubborn as a nail 
household” (dingzihu), a family who refused to vacate their home to make way for real estate 
development in Chongqing, Sichuan Province, attracted international attention throughout the 
world in March 2007, and led to a negotiated settlement with the developers the following 
month. This was seen as a test case on the government’s enforcement of the new Property 
Law. Likewise, the protests by residents of the coastal city of Xiamen in the second half of 
2007 forced a giant petrochemical plant (investment of US$1.41 billion) with strong political 
connections and government support to be relocated elsewhere, probably the first direct 
concession made by the Chinese government to public demands through demonstrations. 
Again in January 2008, similar protests by Shanghai residents forced the Shanghai 
government to reconsider its Maglev Train project to connect the Hongqiao International 
Airport to the Pudong International Airport. In November 2008, starting from Chongqing, 
one of China's four provincial-level municipalities, and extending later to Jingzhou, Lanzhou, 
Sanya, Dali, Shantou and other cities,  thousands of taxi drivers went on strikes over high 
operating costs, high traffic fines, shortages of natural gas and the government's lack of 
efforts in reining in unlicensed taxi operators who were stealing fares away. Local 
governments in these cities negotiated with strikers and took emergency measures to address 
their demands. These examples are significant because the Chinese government, with its 
tradition of top-down decision making, secretive deliberations and little tolerance for dissent, 
previously had almost no practice of engaging in real popular consultation.  
 
Rights lawyers have not only rigorously defended various victims of rights abuses, but also 
played an important role as opinion leaders to link rights defence cases with political 
aspirations for the rule of law and constitutional democracy. In their role as professional 
lawyers, they not only represented clients in ordinary cases, but also took up politically 
sensitive cases involving victims of state power, defending political and civil rights with a 
focus on cases of wider social and political significance, and provided legal aid for 
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individual and collective rights defence action kept within the realm of law. As legal activists 
and opinion leaders, they publish regularly on “sensitive topics” via the Internet and other 
media outlets, organise or participate in political petitions, and consciously use lawsuits as 
social mobilisation for legal and political reform (Ji & Wang 2005). 
 
Precisely because of this dual role, rights lawyers have been constantly harassed by the party-
state: blacklisted, suspended, monitored, confined, detained or even jailed (Fu 2006; Liu 
2006). Lawyers, and particularly rights defence lawyers, are vulnerable due primarily to 
continuing flaws in the Chinese legal system, which still does not recognise a fully 
independent judiciary and privileges the Party-State over any of its “enemies”, real or 
imagined. As late as 1996, when the PRC Lawyers Law was enacted, the State owned every 
law firm and lawyers were treated as civil servants (“State legal workers”), expected to 
uphold the interests of the State as their central priority. While most law firms have now been 
privatised (Michelson 2006), lawyers are still tightly controlled by the State’s regulatory 
body, the Ministry of Justice, and its provincial counterparts, the Bureaus of Justice. These 
Bureaus monopolise the most important powers for management of lawyers, including 
granting, suspending and revoking their practicing licenses, which are reviewed on an annual 
basis. Many rights defence lawyers have lost their licences or faced other State-sanctioned 
harassment simply for attempting to represent their clients in politically “sensitive” cases. 
 
High profile cases where rights defence lawyers have been harassed include Zheng 
Enchong’s imprisonment for three years for representing some evicted Shanghai residents in 
a lawsuit against a real estate developer and the local government; Zhu Jiuhu’s detention for 
representing oil-field operators in Shaanxi whose contractual right to operate oil wells was 
unilaterally and arbitrarily taken away by the local government without proper compensation; 
Li Baiguang’s detention for representing peasants in Fujian Province fighting for their land 
rights; Guo Feixiong’s detention for representing villagers in Guangdong in an action to 
recall their village leaders; the suspension of Gao Zhisheng’s practicing license and the 
closure of his law firm for defending Falun Gong members; and the suspension of Guo 
Guoting’s practicing license for defending dissident journalists and Falun Gong practitioners 
(Wang 2006; Fu 2006; Human Rights Watch 2008).  
 
 
State persecution of lawyers: examples  
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Name Charge and Punishment Time  Location 
Zheng Enchong  3 years in prison for “leaking state secrets”   2003 Shanghai 
Li Baiguang detention for “swindling” 2004 Fujian 
Guo Guoting suspension and exile for “inciting 
subversion” 
2005 Shanghai 
Zhu Jiuhu detention for “disturbing social order” 2005 Shaanxi 
Guo Feixiong 5 years in prison for “illegal operation” 2006 Guangdong 
Gao Zhisheng 3 years in prison with 5 years of probation 
for “inciting subversion”; indefinite 
suspension 
2006 Beijing 
Chen Guangcheng 4 years in prison for “disturbing social 
order” 
2007 Shandong 
Li Heping Being beaten for representing “sensitive 
cases” 
2007 Beijing 
Teng Biao Kidnap for representing dissidents 2008 Beijing 
Teng Biao and 
Jiang Tianyong 




Lawyers are no enemies of the state, and the current regime in China is eagerly promoting the 
use of law and lawyers to foster social stability and political legitimacy. In rights issues that 
do not pose a direct challenge to the legitimacy of the CCP and political stability, such as 
consumer rights, rights of minority shareholders, or women’s rights, lawyers’ contributions to 
the process have become indispensable.
 
There is even a new trend that “legal profession” 
personnel [zhengfa xi], including lawyers, judges, legal scholars and People’s Congress 
deputies, are fast ascending to replace technocrats in leadership positions within the party-
state (Fan 2005b; Lao 2005; Wang 2006).   
 
The clashes between rights lawyers and the party-state indicate profound contradictions in 
current legal and political systems in China. On the one hand, mainly through importing 
legal institutions from the West, a modern legal system has been established since the late 
1970s (Zou 2006). On the other hand, the Chinese Communist Party still seeks to maintain 
their monopoly on political power and the power structure of Leninist party-state, creating 
intrinsic contradictions between the rule of law and the supremacy of the Party. The 
constitution is granted the “highest legal authority”; courts are granted power to handle law 
cases; and legal norms and procedures are put in place to protect citizens against abuses. 
However, according to the concept of “socialist rule of law”, the principle of the “Party 
leadership” must be upheld and the Party power should not be undermined by law. As a 
consequence, rights lawyers were punished when they crossed the line drew by the Party, 
although the authorities have refrained from suppressing the legal activism of rights lawyers 
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entirely, at least partly because it operates carefully within the law and uses China’s judicial 
system to advance its aims.  
 
Implications for China’s transition to constitutional democracy 
Several empirical studies have been carried out on the practices of Chinese lawyers and legal 
aid workers (Michelson 2006; 2007; Gallagher 2006; S.Liu 2006; Cai 2007). However, these 
studies do not focus on rights defence lawyers, and they conclude that the vast majority of 
Chinese lawyers have no interest in upholding the rights of ordinary citizens against State-
supported defendants. The reasons for this reluctance are that such cases are both politically 
risky and often have little or no economic pay-off (Michelson, 2006). It is true that only a 
small minority of lawyers are actively engaged in rights defence cases, but we argue that the 
social and political impact of these lawyers is much broader than their numbers might 
suggest. It is extremely important to study this impact, and to demonstrate the link between 
the work of these lawyers and broader political and social reforms in China. 
 
The rights defence movement is a tremendous boost to the initial development of civil society 
in China, transforming the peoples’ consciousness from that of obedient subjects to 
autonomous citizens; transforming the orientation of many quasi-governmental organisations 
from the Party-State to their true constituencies among the people; and encouraging  citizens 
to further organise themselves for civil rights purposes. As tens of thousands of NGOs and 
professional associations play increasingly important roles in economic, social and political 
change in China and the term “civil society” (gongmin shehui) has long become part of 
Chinese political vocabulary, there is a debate among China’s scholars whether the concept 
of “civil society” can be applied in analysing this new development (Brook and Frolic 1997). 
Our position is that civil society should be understood as the intermediate associational realm 
situated between the state on the one end and the private realm (including individuals, 
families and firms) on the other. Contrary to the experience in the West, where civil society 
grew naturally from the society, the emerging civil society in China today comes from the 
reversing direction and is dependent on the withdrawal of, and subject to the negotiation with, 
the Leninist party-state, which had taken up the space of associational life and continues to 
deny the right of citizens to free association (Feng 2006). However, the popularising of the 
term “rights defence” and its daily practice have a synergistic impact in enhancing rights 
consciousness. There are indications that many social organisations and professional 
associations in China, including the official Trade Unions, the Women’s Federation, 
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Federation of Industry and Commerce, and Lawyers Associations are all beginning to play a 
far more active role in rights defence within the boundaries sanctioned by the party-state. The 
Internet, and increasingly the state-controlled media, are also contributing to the emergence 
of a genuine public sphere and serious debates on social and political issues. Migrant 
workers, numbering more than 100 million, have started to establish their own unions, and 
the call for the establishment of peasant associations receives increasing support from 
enlightened government officials as well as the public.  
 
The rights defence movement also contributes to the progress of the rule of law and 
democratic transition in China. Convinced that there is an interdependence between economic 
and political development, China scholars seem to have reached a consensus that China will 
democratise in the long run, either through an evolution entailed by sustained economic 
growth, openness to the outside world and the accompanying social change, or through a 
violent eruption when an unexpected economic breakdown challenges the remaining 
legitimacy of the current regime, based as it is primarily on economic performance 
(Brzezinski, et al 1998). However, opinions are divisive about the timing of democratisation 
in China, and scholars have found it hard to identify the kinds of actors who will actually 
bring about democracy there. There is a huge body of literature on the decline or crisis of 
Communist rule, the emergence of democratic ideas, and the development of the democratic 
movement against the Chinese Communist dictatorship (Davis 1995; Weatherley 1999; 
Angle 2002). However, research that focuses on the democratic movement in opposition to 
the Party-State has not been able to provide satisfactory answers to the questions of timing 
and actors, because the exiled leaders of this opposition movement have been effectively 
marginalised by the CCP. 
 
Answers should be sought elsewhere. The processes of the transformation in other former 
communist countries have shown that most important actors were “inside the system” rather 
than “outside the system” (Feng 2008). Rights defence lawyers have helped to frame the 
demands of protesters within the broader language of defending basic human rights, and have 
thereby shamed the Chinese Party-State into upholding its own laws and stated ideals. As a 
new development, Rights lawyers played an essential role in drafting up Chapter 08, known 
by some as the “Chinese human rights manifesto”, signed by more than 8,000 Chinese 
citizens since its publication on the Internet on 9 December 2008, clearly articulating 
constitutional democracy as an alternative to one-party dictatorship in China and spelling out 
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19 steps for political reforms, including a new constitution, freedom of speech and assembly, 
an independent judiciary and democratic elections for all levels of government.  
 
There are those who argue that progress in rule of law is irrelevant to the political transition 
to democracy. It is our belief that the quest for rule of law is vital for China’s transition to 
constitutional democracy, which we would define as a political system where the legitimacy 
of the government is ensured by fair elections and government powers are limited by a 
constitution that guarantees fundamental rights through a democratic legislature, an 
accountable executive and an impartial judiciary. Law, even if it is the same, functions 
differently in different political systems. There is a fundamental difference between the “rule 
by law”, in which the law is an instrument for rulers, and the “rule of law”, in which the law 
is an instrument used by everyone for justice and the rulers are also subject to the law. 
(Maravall & Przeworski 2003). The rule of law is intrinsic to constitutional democracy but 
impossible in a dictatorship or autocracy, simply because dictators and autocrats are not 
subject to law. Some scholars have argued that China will continue reforming its legal system 
while maintaining the current authoritarian political regime for the foreseeable future, a so-
called “thin” rule of law system (Peerenboom 2002, 2006). Yet this view underestimates the 
catalytic power of reforms to the legal system, particularly in the current international 
environment, when the Chinese government must be seen to embrace universal human rights 
norms in order to retain its international credibility and continue to attract foreign investment. 
As the government ratifies human rights and other international treaties, it faces increasing 
pressure both domestically and internationally to uphold the basic legal rights of its citizens, 
as set out in its national laws and constitution. Rights defence lawyers clearly understand this 
dynamic, and in seeking to assist citizens to uphold their legal rights, many of these lawyers 
have a much more ambitious agenda in mind. In their various writings, these rights defence 
lawyers clearly relate their legal work to a broader political and social reform agenda. (Teng 
2007; Mo 2008; Xu 2008). They making the Chinese government more accountable to its 
citizens, and this will require much deeper reforms to the legal structure – such as introducing 
a truly independent judiciary and removing the influence of the Communist Party over the 
appointment and discharge of judges and lawyers. (Wang 2005) In other words, they demand 
a “thick” rule of law system, which can only function normally in the power structure of 
constitutional democracy.  
 
Conclusion 
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By definition, the current rights defence movement in China is a social movement asserting 
the constitutional rights by Chinese citizens through lawful means within the legal framework 
of the country. With their professional knowledge and extraordinary courage, rights defence 
lawyers have fought in the frontline and provided leadership to this emerging movement 
(Carnes 2006; Li 2007). Led by this group of rights lawyers, some citizens in China have 
been able to file and even win their cases at courts, achieving concessions and negotiated 
outcomes from the state. However, it is inevitable that rights defenders are forced to at least 
implicitly confront and challenge the political structure of one-party dictatorship. The system 
of Leninist party-state is set up in such a way so as to virtually ensure that corruption and 
abuse of power become endemic, since there is no access to an independent media, no 
independent judiciary court system, no political opposition and no accountability guaranteed 
by regular elections.  The battles of the rights defence movement at the legal front may 
provide an important step for political reform toward constitutional democracy.  
 
The impacts of rights defence cases in contemporary China have extended far beyond the 
judiciary domain. The most recent wave of rights defence protests has shown the 
determination of Chinese citizens to assert their right to be consulted in decisions that directly 
affect their lives, a clear sign of their awakening sense of real citizenship. For those rights 
lawyers, well educated and idealistic, the ultimate aim of the right defence movement is to 
effect a political transition from one-party dictatorship to constitutional democracy. Using the 
laws and courts the party-state has put in place, they are putting into effect the state rhetoric 
on rights and translating constitutional rights into reality. The end result can be a robust civil 
society with legal protection of human rights, predominance of the rule of law, and a political 
structure of constitutional democracy in which the government is formed through periodic 
elections and subject to the law.  
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